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Abstract—The concept of a blockchain has given way to the
development of cryptocurrencies, enabled smart contracts, and
unlocked a plethora of other disruptive technologies. But, beyond
its use case in cryptocurrencies, and in network coordination and
automation, blockchain technology may have serious sociotechni-
cal implications in the future co-existence of robots and humans.
Motivated by the recent explosion of interest around blockchains,
and our extensive work on open-source blockchain technology
and its integration into robotics - this paper provides insights in
ways in which blockchains and other decentralized technologies
can impact our interactions with robot agents and the social
integration of robots into human society.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Smart Contracts, Cryptocurrencies,
Decentralized Identity, Human-Robot Interaction
I. INTRODUCTION
Beyond constrained task-driven human-robot collaboration,
it is worthy to project future scenarios where a robot with even
the utmost limited intelligence and autonomy might have the
need to engage in relatively similar human social interactions,
such as agreements and financial transactions.
Consideration on the concepts of agreements and finan-
cial transactions between humans and robots is not novel.
Currently, human-robot interaction (HRI) research, for exam-
ple, introduces such transactions in experiments that apply
monetary rewards to game-like scenarios between robots and
humans. But, such interactions fail to fully or accurately
replicate the unmediated peer-to-peer financial transactions
that take place between humans. For example, during in-lab
experiments a human subject might expect that winning a
monetary bet against a robot implies that in the end a human
researcher will be the one making the monetary payment - not
the robot itself. Although unexplored in current HRI research,
this type of mediated interaction might present physical fram-
ing effects [6] and even lead to expectation bias over such
interaction. This could be the case in experiments that model
competitive games between humans and robots and then apply
traditional game theory to explain outcomes [31] [12].
Hence, we further note that traditional game theory explores
how rational agents play against other agents who are expected
to be rational [36]. Humans are not over-rational agents and
various features of an interaction, both physical and psycho-
logical, can impact the end-result of an interaction. Therefore,
behavioral game theory - which introduces psychology into
game theory, might provide a better framework to assess
such interactions [6]. Nonetheless, this implies that we must
further consider factors that might lead to predisposed biases,
overconfidence, and other artifacts that lead to an unrealistic
experience in a human-robot interaction.
A human-robot interaction mediated by a third-party human,
may be considered a factor that violates realism and which
binds results to lab environments. After all, in a world where
robots and humans co-exists we cannot, or perhaps should
not, always expect a human to be present as a mediator. It is
possible that the design of a human-robot interaction that more
accurately replicates the direct interaction between a human
and another human, e.g. during a bargain or a competitive
game, might lead to different results that more accurately
reflect human perspective on robots. Section IV highlights the
difference between expectation and the reality of transactions
related to bargains or of financial nature.
In HRI research that involves competitive games, bargains,
and promises - we can partially attribute such unrealism to the
constraints of conventional fiat money and the lack of tools
to perform direct peer-to-peer exchanges of value between
a robot and a human. Furthermore, we can observe that
formal agreements between a human and a robot cannot be
fully replicate nor incite the realism of a human-to-human
interaction due to the lack of agency in robots, restrictions
on the enforceability of such agreements, and overall the lack
of technology that allows for these agreements to take place.
For example, consider modeling the following agreement that
incorporates two clauses that state that (a) if a robot with a
given identifier alpha completes a task beta (e.g picking
up Lego blocks from a given workspace) within time delta,
then (b) the robot alpha will receive a reward in the amount
of gamma dollars or tokens. In this interaction, we might be
interested in exploring the role and perception of a human as
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the enforcer or supervisor of a robot. But, similarly, we can
reverse the roles and place the human as the agent that must
perform the task, and the robot as the enforcer or supervisor.
The first scenario, of a human as a supervisor, is novel
and has not been explored. This is in part to previously stated
constraints. But, we might still ask ourselves the following:
a) How might one issue a monetary reward to a robot?
b) Why might a robot need money?
c) What utility does money bring to a robot?
d) Where might a robot spend money?
e) How can we make such agreement enforceable and
provide stronger guarantees of fairness to the robot?
The second scenario which places the robot as the super-
visor is most commonly addressed in literature, particularly
on behavior modification and persuasive robotics. The study
of human psychology presents a system based on a token
economy; tokens redeemable for goods or freedoms [24].
Persuasive robotics includes psychological rewards in addition
to tangible rewards [32] [13]. But, similarly, we might consider
how tangible it is for a robot to offer a reward to a human,
and how we can realistically model such interaction. We can
explore the following questions, among others:
a) How might a robot transfer a, monetary or non-monetary,
reward to a human?
b) How can a robot monitor a task assigned to a human?
c) How can we make such agreement enforceable?
As for the first scenario, we can consider a near future in
which robots whether semi or fully autonomous might have
the necessity to engage in financial transactions with a human.
e.g. a robot might find that it is most optimal to purchase a
service as part of a global plan to fulfill a task - hailing a
taxi instead of using its innate locomotion system. A robot
might also be required to enter into a financial transaction
as part of a proxied interaction for its respective owner (e.g.
in telepresence). Hence, for robots, money could serve the
purpose of a social tool as it serves humans, allowing for
better engagement and interaction with a human society.
But, the constraints of fiat money present a barrier to
robots, not just the physical nature of money, but also the
technosocial boundaries that are set by financial services over
the ownership of money and the establishment of credit. For
the most part, making an online purchase requires a credit card,
and acquiring a credit card requires various human-centric
processes such as an identification card, a credit score, or a
physical address. The other question is over the enforceability
of an agreement, how can we guarantee that a human will not
cheat a robot? Or at least reduce the probability of such event.
When considering either scenario with only human parties
involved, we can address enforceability and fairness by relying
on third-parties to mediate or arbitrate.
For example, consider if a mother played the role of a
supervisor and requested her child to perform a given task
in exchange of a reward. If upon completion of the task, the
mother denied the reward to the child on any given basis,
the child can involve another party to serve as an arbitrator or
mediator - we can imagine that another family member such as
the father could play the role of arbitrator / mediator. But, we
can also consider that for quantitatively measurable tasks we
can introduce technology that monitors the task and provides
trustworthy attestable information. Similarly, in agreements
between a robot and a human, mechanisms should exists that
not only introduce fairness, but also provide security over the
obligations of not just the robot but as well of the human -
concepts such as arbitrators and trusted sources of information
should be available and applied.
Blockchain technology - smart contracts, cryptocurrencies,
and the study of cryptoeconomics serve as the enabling
constructs of the latter discussion. Beyond their application
on agreements and peer-to-peer financial transactions between
robots and humans, these technologies have deeper sociotech-
nical implications on the coexistence of robots and humans,
the set of possible interactions between robots and humans,
and also implications on the interactions between robots. Ad-
ditionally, Decentralized Identity [11] and the ability of robots
and things (IoT) to obtain such identity can be considered one
of the interesting technologies derived from blockchain.
This paper describes future prospects of financial transacting
and contracting between robots and humans, and amongst
robots. The recipe for such interactions are based on three
key technologies: (1) Blockchain(s), (2) Smart Contracts, and
(3) Cryptocurrencies. The application of these technologies
into the world of robotics leads us into uncharted territory
that should be further explored by fields such as human-
robot interaction, law, social policy and other social sciences.
Section II presents the foundations of this paper which include
blockchains, cryptocurrencies, smart contracts and decentral-
ized identity. Section III discusses the integration of such
technologies into the world robotics. Section IV discusses
a survey we performed and our current work. Section V
concludes the paper with a discussion that includes further
considerations and additional applications.
II. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION
A. Blockchains
Accounting/bookkeeping dates as far back as the times of
Mesopotamia [18], with the innovation of double-entry book-
keeping [1] serving to this day as the basic foundation of how
we account for value. In modern times, this process has been
digitized and the logic of debits and credits implemented on
top of traditional database systems. At a high-level, the latter
allows parties to have traceability of individual transaction and
obligations, and can provide a global view of the entire state
of accounts. Generalizing this concept, we can see that other
industries also leverage processes and systems that allow them
to trace transactions amongst various parties.
In the world of finance - banks and other third parties
such as payment processors and clearing houses rely on the
concept of maintaining a book of records (i.e. a ledger)
of all financial transactions. In a fiat economy, an accurate
version of ledgers is primordial to financial transacting. But,
currently, the implementation of such ledgers is bespoke and
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF PROPERTIES AND APPLICATION IN ROBOTICS
Technology Properties Application in Robotics
Blockchain
Decentralized, Global, Immutable,
Verifiable, Secure 1, Public 2
• Globally record references and authenticate access to robots and operational logs
• Blockchain addresses can serve as unique identifiers
• Use PKI to encrypt/decrypt information
• Serves as infrastructure for smart contracts
• Common infrastructure for decentralized identity
• Optional infrastructure for private/secure P2P messaging
Cryptocurrencies
(Coins & Tokens)
Decentralized, Global, Permissionless,
Trusteless, Instantaneous, Irreversible,
Secure, Programmable, Pseudonymous,
Controlled Supply
• Can be used as currency or medium of exchange
• E.g. used to purchase (physical/digital) goods and services
• Tokens can represent fractional ownership of a robot (asset)
• Can be used to simulate token economy in behavioral studies
• Token can represent service rights to a robot (utility)
• Can be programmed through smart contracts
Smart Contracts
Decentralized, Global,
Self-verifiable,
Self-executable,
Tamper-proof
• Contract logic between robot and human can be defined
• Asset ownership can be represented as tokens and programmed
• Can model robot services and utilities as tokens
• Can monitor events on the blockchain and self-execute logic
• Access rights and consent to operation of robots can be defined
Decentralized
Identity Decentralize, Global, Permissionless, Programmable
• Allows robots to attach historical records to an identity
• Allows robots to claim physical and digital property
1The previous properties make it secure.
centralized, with no transparency to external transacting parties
- every party bound to a bespoke ledger. This in turn leads to
inefficiencies related to data reconciliation and concerns when
performing high-value network transactions.
A blockchain offers itself as a solution to these problems
by doing away with the need for centralized, bespoke, and
opaque ledgers, and instead presenting the use of a single
immutable, decentralized, publicly verifiable 2 ledger that can
digitally record anything of value (e.g. a deed, a land title,
identity, or a financial transaction).
Historically, the genesis of the word and the concept of
a blockchain was brought forth by Bitcoin, the fully-digital,
decentralized cryptocurrency [23]. The blockchain is the un-
derlying technology that enables Bitcoin and other decentral-
ized platforms. Whereby by in Bitcoin, the blockchain is used
mainly as a ledger that keeps track of all Bitcoin transactions
[23], in Ethereum its use is extended to include the storage,
execution, and auditing of smart contracts [5]. From a techni-
cal standpoint, we can consider that the actual data structure
and the technologies underlying blockchains are not new. It is
based on decades of academic research on topics that include
cryptography, distributed systems, mathematics and incentive
engineering. The true innovation lies in making all of these
work together in harmony, and in the real-world deployment
of a consensus protocol that combines these technologies -
allowing users to cooperate on building together a chain of
records all on their own, without the need of central party.
Since its inception, the technical architecture of a blockchain
has evolved, and even novel architectures [17] are being
implemented. But, the concept of a public ledger that allows
anyone (or anything) to record and share valuable data in a
2In recent years the concept private and permissioned blockchains has
emerged which by definition are not fully decentralized, and by design do not
necessitate nor incorporate a native cryptocurrency. This papers argues for the
use of a public blockchain.
secure, verifiable, tamper-proof way remains at the heart of
all implementations2. It is what enables various use cases of
cross-industry and global coordination and collaboration 3. It
is the technology that aims to eliminate the need for trust, and
dependence on third-parties and intermediaries.
We leave it up to the user to further explore the technicalities
of a blockchain by reviewing the ample literature such as the
following [3] [30], and instead we focus on discussing the
implication of having a ledger with such properties available
for use in the world of robotics (or in a world filled with
robots). For the purposes of our work we focus on the use
of public permissionless blockchains2, for we believe that the
future is decentralized the concepts of trust and security should
not lie in the hands of central authorities.
B. Cryptocurrencies
Cryptocurrencies provide a means to perform global finan-
cial transactions with anyone or anything that can generate a
blockchain wallet address. Cryptocurrencies can be divided
into two categories a native blockchain coin (e.g. Bitcoin,
Ether, or Litecoin), or tokens. Coins serve as a currency
or medium of exchange, and transactions occur on their
respective native blockchain. On the other hand, tokens are
a representation of a particular asset or utility that can be
created through the use of smart contracts, e.g. commodities
or reward points can represented as tokens. The interplay
between a blockchain and smart contracts in essence makes
cryptopcurrencies programmable money.
To store coins or tokens a wallet address is needed
from the respective blockchain the agent will interact with.
For the most part, the creation of an address such as an
Ethereum address requires the derivation of a public key from
a private key, and other cryptographic operations. For humans,
3Blockchain is being applied to various industries such as supply chain,
finance, IoT, big data
user-friendly wallet software such as MetaMask [21] and
Portis [29] can simplify the creation of a wallet address and
also simplify the interaction with decentralized applications
(DApp) on blockchains like Ethereum. A DApp is traditionally
composed of a front-end application that connects to a smart
contract. To send cryptocurrency or to interact with a smart
contract, the address of the recipient or smart contract address
is needed, then the sender’s private key is used to sign the
transaction; lastly the transaction is sent into the blockchain.
The aforementioned wallet software solutions simplify these
steps by displaying graphical user interfaces and performing
the adequate cryptographic functions behind the scenes.
Various cryptocurrencies have previously existed, but Bit-
coin is the first fully digital decentralized cryptocurrency
to exist [23] - it’s decentralized nature brought forth by the
blockchain. Bitcoin, as a cryptocurrency, is generated through
what is known as mining. It is a process that secures
the integrity of the blockchain by requiring a network of
computers to validate transactions and compete to solve a
cryptographic puzzle in order create a ”block” of transactions
and append it to the ”chain”, and in turn be awarded newly
minted Bitcoins. These newly minted Bitcoins in essence serve
as an incentive mechanism to keep the operators of these
computers (miners) honest and active. Other blockchains,
such as Ethereum rely on the same process.
C. Smart Contracts
The idea of a smart contract was first conceived by Nick
Szabo in the 1990’s [34]. In verbatim, Szabo proposed a
”computerized transaction protocol that executes the terms of
a contract” [34]. In his work, Szabo essentially described a
means by which trust on fallible parties can be transformed
into functional trust provided by software that operates on
predefined rules. Overall, smart contracts can be seen as digital
agreements that can embody complex contractual relationships
in code and which are self-executable, self-enforceable and
tamper-proof.
Smart contracts were later popularized by Bitcoin and fully
put into practice by Ethereum [23] [5]. In bitcoin, simple
implementations of smart contracts were generated using a
stack-based scripting language that allowed users to program
Bitcoin transactions. Such programs allowed for execution
of multi-signature transactions or escrow payments. In later
years, Ethereum was developed as an effort to create a world
computer, that leverages a blockchain and which provides a
platform for developing and deploying smart contracts. Unlike
Bitcoin, Ethereum provided a Turing-complete programming
language that allows for more complex smart contracts.
The fully digital, and decentralized, nature of smart con-
tracts and cryptocurrencies allows humans and robots to de-
velop and enter into unilateral and bilateral agreements, as
well as engage into peer-to-peer (unmediated) transactions.
D. Decentralized Identity
Very few concepts are more important to functioning in
a human society and economy than the concept of identity.
As humans, we make use of our identities to establish trust
and make claims of ownership or individual rights. Presently,
human identity can be claimed through passports, driving
licenses, or by context-specific identifiers such as a work ID
or even a social media account. Tied to these identities are the
attributes that define and make a human identifiable. Attributes
such as a birth date, a name, an address, biometric informa-
tion, and unique identifiers issued by government entities as
passport numbers or driver’s license numbers. These attributes
are part of our identity. Often than not, a history of financial
transactions and obligations are tied to identities and used to
qualify an individual (e.g. credit worthiness). In future social
road maps, in countries like China, a social credit system is
even tied to government-issued identifiers [35].
Decentralized Identity centered around the stan-
dard of self-sovereign identifiers reverses the traditional
paradigm of identity [14]. Fundamental to the Decentralized
Identity paradigm is allowing users to directly create, manage
and dispose of many decentralized identifiers (DIDs) without
the need of third parties, while still being able to recall the
properties attached to such identifiers. [14] [11]. This approach
of giving the user full control is what makes it self-sovereign.
To this end, the use of a decentralized infrastructure and
methods, such as a blockchain and public-key cryptography,
are suitable. For example, instead of identity distribution
authorities, DIDs could be issued and access control could
be handled by a blockchain. But, it is worthy to note that a
public key derived from a private key can suffice as a unique
identifier, but we would require a proper means to record
and trace transactions tied to such identifier - the blockchain
provides the necessary infrastructure for such transactions.
This paradigm has as many implication on humans, as well
as on robots. For humans, this means the possibility to have
more control over one’s identity. For robots this means the
possibility to even have an adequate means of identification
and the ability to attach historical information/attributes that
represent an identity.
III. ROBOT-HUMAN TRANSACTIONS
We consider the following: (1) A blockchain can serve as
a ledger on which robots and humans may access and record
anything of value, such as an ownership title or a financial
transaction. (2) Smart contracts can encode agreement logic
between a robot and a human that is self-enforceable self-
verifiable. (3) Cryptocurrencies can allow robots to hold
financial obligations and enter into exchanges of value with a
human, and vice versa. Lastly, we consider that the application
and extension of the three can lead to more sophisticated
and realistic interactions between robots and humans; and in
the near future their application could ease the integration
of robots into society. Table I presents a summary of the
properties and application of each technology in robotics. In
the following sections we elaborate their applications.
A. A decentralized, immmutable and publicly verifiable ledger
Similar to its application in IoT [20], a blockchain can be
used for security and access management schemes of robots,
data, and communication. Public key encryption can be used
to encrypt messages between robots and data logs that are
stored externally. Digital signatures can be further used to
authenticate access to the data and the access to control a
robot. If low-latency and low-cost transactions are possible, a
blockchain may also be used for ”on-chain” communication
and signaling. Agents may execute transactions on a given
blockchain address and other agents may listen to transactions
on such address. For such scheme, a blockchain that provides
sub-second confirmation time such as [28], may be most
suitable. Other proposed communication protocols such as
Whisper [5] can also be leveraged.
B. Contracts
Smart contracts can encode the logic of unilateral4 and
bilateral5 legal agreements. Their digital nature allows cy-
berphysical agents to interact with such logic and enter into
agreements with other robots or human agents.
Fig. 1. Autonomous Vehicle Smart Contract Example
1) Ownership: Listing 1 shows the partial interface defi-
nition of a smart contract for the use case in Fig. III-B. It
presents the use case of fractional ownership of an autonomous
vehicle. The vehicle in turn is used as an autonomous taxi.
Rather than tokenizing the ownership, the smart contract
simply defines a set of owners in line 4, and a function
that allows ownership transfer in line 10. A more extensive
implementation of such smart contract, would include other
smart contracts that automate additional processes and allow
for on-chain governance of the ride-sharing service.
A governance contract could allow owners of the vehicle to
propose ballots to update parameters of other smart contracts.
A ballot could be proposed to increase the service fee for
taking a ride on the vehicle. Another ballot could be proposed
to increase the allocated funds for maintenance of the vehicle.
In Fig. III-B, such maintenance contract could be triggered
by the vehicle when sensors indicate it needs servicing (e.g.
4One-sided agreements in which only the offeror promises to fulfill a
given obligation after the occurrence of a given act [15].
5Two-sided agreements in which a promise is given in exchange for a
promise in return. Each party is both an obligor - a party bounded to another
party, and an obligee - a party to whom another is obligated or bound [16].
an oil change). The contract can communicate to an Oracle
service that can provide pricing information of nearby service
providers. A service provider could then be informed by the
Oracle service that the vehicle is in need of service and
generate an escrow contract that includes a pricing quote and
a set of obligations that the provider will meet.
The vehicle can then accept the contract and send the
amount quoted in cryptocurrency to the escrow contract. Upon
completion of the service, the service provider signals the
escrow contract that the service has been completed. Then the
vehicle is notified and can assess whether the contract/service
agreement has been fulfill (e.g. checking oil sensors). If the
criteria is met, the vehicle can confirm the service by signing
a transaction that is sent to the escrow contract. The escrow
contract would then release the funds to the service provider.
1 c o n t r a c t R i d e S h a r i n g C o n t r a c t {
2 a d d r e s s p u b l i c v e h i c l e ;
3 b y t e s 3 2 p u b l i c v i n ;
4 a d d r e s s [ ] p u b l i c owners ;
5 a d d r e s s p a s s e n g e r ;
6
7 f u n c t i o n v i n ( ) c o n s t a n t r e t u r n s ( b y t e s 3 2 v i n ) ;
8 f u n c t i o n owners ( ) c o n s t a n t r e t u r n ( a d d r e s s owners ) ;
9 f u n c t i o n se tOwners ( a d d r e s s [ ] ownerAddrs ) ;
10 f u n c t i o n a p p r o v e T r a n s f e r ( a d d r e s s t o ) ;
11 f u n c t i o n r e q u e s t R i d e ( ) ;
12
13 e v e n t RideReq ( a d d r e s s i n d e x e d passengerAddr , u i n t 2 5 6
r i d e C o s t ) ;
14 e v e n t T r a n s f ( a d d r e s s i n d e x e d from , a d d r e s s i n d e x e d
t o ) ;
15 e v e n t Appr ( a d d r e s s i n d e x e d owner , a d d r e s s i n d e x e d
approved ) ;
16 }
Listing 1. Partial Interface Definition of Smart Contract
Fig. 2. Unilateral Contract Flow
2) Escrow Services: Figure III-B1 presents a state diagram
of a unilateral contract. One of the most common examples are
open requests or reward contracts, e.g. offering a reward for
a lost pet. By offering a reward, the owner promises to fulfill
the payment should anyone fulfill the obligation of returning
the pet. Similarly, a robot can offer an unilateral contract
to the public. In [8], the robot can either offer a unilateral
or bilateral contract to any individual willing to transport
the robot to a given destination. In the unilateral version of
the contract, the robot initializes the contract by defining its
current location based on its GPS location, the goal destination
and the payment for taking the robot to the goal destination.
A human willing to accept the contract can carry the robot to
the destination and sign the smart contract upon completion.
Legal contracts are backed by a legal system and are subject
to interpretation. In smart contracts ”the code is law”. That is,
the logic defined in a smart contract and the inputs provided
to the smart contract define the ultimate outcome. Hence, the
logic of a smart contract must be carefully drafted and the
inputs provided to a smart contract must be trustworthy.
Fig. 3. Decentralized Escrow Service Agents
Meaning that conditional logic, such as the transfer of funds,
will be executed given the respective input. Hence, we must
consider what a breach of contract would entail, and how a
robot could file for a breach of contract on a human, and vice
versa. We can consider that a ”breach of smart contract”,
in the human-sense, could be brought upon either by (a) a
malicious actor that gains access to the private keys of either
party, (b) a malfunction of the robot, or (c) an error from a
data source or a malicious data source provider. Code bugs can
also cause issues, but can be prevented with proper auditing.
To deal with such issues, in a buyer-seller scenario a smart
contract such as in [10] can be used. But, we can also consider
the use of an escrow smart contract that allows an escrow
agent to arbitrate and that uses an oracle service to provide
trustworthy data to the smart contract. In a decentralized
escrow system, the parties transact through an escrow smart
contract in which an escrow agent chosen by both parties
oversees the transaction. If a dispute over the transaction
occurs, the escrow agent can intervene and choose whether
either party deserves to be refunded or paid. Figure III-B2
illustrates the flow of an escrow transaction.
C. Human-Robot Interaction
1) Games: Given the peer-to-peer nature of the technology
we can more faithfully design ummediated interactions that
allows a robot to directly engage into a bilateral agreement
with a human. Figure III-C shows the sequence diagram of a
Fig. 4. Sequence Diagram: Human vs Robot Chess Game + Betting
physical game of chess between a robot and a human. Both
parties make a traditional bet of winner takes all.
A traditional implementation of this human-robot interac-
tion within a lab environment would require that a human
researcher initially present the human subject with the context
of the game. Essentially, presenting a competitive game with a
monetary reward at stake. The winner of the game receives the
monetary reward. The monetary compensation is often defined
as a rewards card. Considering framing effects as discussed in
[6], this game does not fully lend itself to a realistic interaction
that we might expect to take place between a human and a
robot with a high sense of intelligence and agency. We might
expect that during a competitive game, a human subject might
not only consider what’s at stake but also consider how the
opposing party views what is at stake (e.g. utility of the award).
In the context of a rewards card, we cannot realistically
expect that a robot has any personal utility for the card due
to the fact that a robot cannot personally access traditional
physical, or online marketplaces, and place an order with
such rewards card. As noted earlier, our society’s traditional
financial infrastructure is inadequate for cyberphysical agents.
On the other hand, as [8] discusses, it is more feasible for
a robot agent to use cryptocurrency to financially transact
with humans and other robots. Given the emergence of de-
centralized marketplaces - marketplaces that do not leverage
traditional financial infrastructure or have stringent know-
your-customer (KYC) requirements, and often deal solely
with cryptocurrencies - we can imagine that after winning
a bet a robot can purchase a digital good such as a non-
fungible token [4], a piece of virtual property on a blockchain
game, or purchase a physical good or service through other
decentralized marketplaces such as OpenBazaar [27].
Figure III-C highlights the important steps in the sequence
as dark pink circles embedded with numbers. Four actors are
presented, the human agent, the robot agent, a DApp and
a smart chess board. Both the human agent and the robot
agent have a wallet address and/or wallet software. They make
moves by physically moving the chess pieces on a board. The
chess board is deemed smart because it uses a monitoring
system and a set of physical buttons to report back to the smart
contract that models the chess game. In future scenarios, we
can imagine that a chess board and other physical electronic
games would natively connect to a blockchain.
The smart contract validates the moves and is in charge of
keeping all bets, only releasing funds to the wallet address of
the winning player. The DApp is a user interface connected to
the chess game smart contract. It provides visual feedback of
the state of the game and also allows either player to sign the
contract and place a bet. A human user can simply scan a QR
code on the application which dictates the rules of the game
and amount of cryptocurrency required to join the game. A
robot can use the latter, or directly send a transaction to the
chess smart contract using a library such as Web3 in Ethereum.
Other games could be similarly modeled, that further en-
gages the robot as the verifying party of the transaction in the
game. That is, requiring the robot to approve whether a move
is valid, or whether the game has been won or lost by the
opponent. Hence, the concepts of cheating and greed can be
more realistically modeled since the robot would be the actual
agent considered in charge of performing or approving a trans-
actions (not a third-party human). Another gaming interaction
is presented in [25]. The latter presents a racing / battle game
in which remote human drivers get to stake cryptocurrency or
purchase the right to drive a robot and race against each other,
additionally allowing the entire world to make bets against
either robot and to purchase additional ”power ups” for the
robots. This is a novel cyberphysical blockchain game that
leverages economic incentives and cryptographic functions to
allow for globally cooperative and adversary gaming.
2) Commitment Strategies and Conditioning: We can fur-
ther consider the use of smart contracts to study commitment
strategies and conditioning [33] [22] [2]. We can imagine the
interplay of smart contracts and sophisticated machines that
can counteract a human’s short-term impulses by entering into
agreements with a human. For example, a smart fridge can
enter into a temporal agreement with a human and prevent the
human from opening the fridge late at night or access to certain
food cabins. Placing such logic on a smart contract, once
again, means the agreement is self-enforcing, self-verifiable,
tamper-proof - unstoppable. From here on, the list of possible
interaction is plenty. A thorough list and implementation of
such interactions are presented in [26] as part of a workshop
presented at the 2019 RO-MAN conference.
IV. PERCEPTION ON FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND
CONTRACTS WITH ROBOTS
Drawing upon early work on behavioral economics, we pre-
sented a series of survey questions to infer on beliefs regarding
robot-human financial transactions and agreements. Each sur-
vey scenario/questions captured, on average, responses from
50 college participants ages 18 - 28. We presented the same
surveys to 20 participants with knowledge in cryptocurrencies
and blockchain technology. Full details on the survey are
presented in [26]. In this section we highlight one of the open-
ended scenarios, summarized as follow:
Scenario. Suppose you are living in the city, in a not so
distant future where robots are common. On a lazy Saturday
you decide to make a trip to the grocery store. As you walk
towards your vehicle to drive to the grocery store, a service
robot approaches you. The service robot kindly asks you for
a ride to a location near the grocery store. It explains that
its power supply is malfunctioning and needs to arrive to the
location as soon as possible to complete a task. In exchange,
the robot offers to pay you a reasonable amount of money for
your troubles.
Participants were asked a set of questions that included
whether they would accept the robot’s offer, and the method of
payment that they envisioned the robot using. In this scenario,
84 percent of the participants considered it ”extremely likely”
to accept the robot’s offer 6. In terms of payment method 7,
92 percent considered the use of a payment service provider,
4 percent chose credit card, and 4 percent ”other”.
Two final open-ended questions asked participants to share
any scenarios in which they imagined a robot making a
payment to a human, and any scenarios in which they imagined
a human paying a robot. The survey also allowed participants
to leave comments regarding the survey - considerations or
reservations over the interaction with the robot.
Insights from the answers to the open-ended questions can
be summarized as follows:
• The concept of money was mostly construed as fiat cash
which is incompatible with the perception of robots
• The robot was mainly considered under a direct (mas-
ter/slave) ownership model, where the owner of the robot
meets the robot’s financial obligation.
• Making payments to service robots and overall the model
of Robot-as-a-Service (RaaS) was identified
• Few participants were able to propose scenarios in which
a robot paid a human. The prevalent scenario was of a
robot using a human utility such as electricity, or during
constrained situations that render the robot immobile.
Follow up interviews with selected participants identified
that in that scenario, participants envisioned the interaction
taking place with a humanoid robot. We consider this corre-
lation an interesting social bias brought upon by the beliefs
of our social structure and ignorance over the technology we
present in this paper. This was noted after presenting the
participants with a model of differential drive mobile-base
robot. On the contrary - when presenting the same open-ended
scenario to participants with knowledge in cryptocurrencies
and blockchain, the interplay between blockchain technology
6A 5-point scale was used that ranged from ”Extremely Likely” to ”Not
at all Likely”
7Five options were given: (1) Cash / Fiat Money, (2) Credit Card, (3)
Check, (4) Payment Service (e.g. Venmo, Cash App, Zelle, PayPal, KakaoPay,
WeChat Pay), (5) Other
and robotics perceived as fitting. Additionally, the latter group
was able to propose more scenarios regarding payments and
agreements between robots and humans.
Although this was a preliminary descriptive study, it serves
as a starting point to further explore the human-robot interac-
tion models afforded by blockchain technology and perceived
biases over such interactions.
V. DISCUSSION
1) Enforceability of Smart Contracts: Legal enforceability
of smart contracts and considerations over transacting with
robots must be further explored by the community.
2) Usability: Blockchain technology has yet to achieve a
mainstream user experience. Users of the technology must be
able to securely store and manage private keys. Solutions such
as storing private keys in hardware wallets are an option, or
using software wallets and services such as [21] and [29].
Users must become familiar with concepts like ”gas” [5] in
the Ethereum network, transaction fees and other concepts.
3) Peer-to-peer Transactions: If we trust that all parties
will behave accordingly, not all transfer of value requires a
smart contract. Consider the second scenario we presented in
the introduction. If the robot employs a sophisticated vision
recognition and event detection algorithm it could notice when
a human subject has completed the task, and in turn reward
the human subject. The robot could ask for the human’s wallet
address and send cryptocurrency directly.
4) Future Applications: Our current work explores the
application of blockchain technology as part of a secure in-
frastructure for fully immersive telepresence robotics - robotic
avatars that replicate an operator’s motions and relay high-
fidelity sensory feedback. Biometric information obtained by
a telepresence control interface such as the one presented in
[19] can be attached to a robot’s decentralized identifier (DID)
and linked to the DID of a human operator. Smart contracts
can serve as access control bridges that require an operator’s
digital signature. Digital signatures can be also used to access
control devices such as a telepresence control garment in [9].
Additionally, we can consider the use of cryptocurrencies by
robotic avatars to transact in a remote environment. Also work
such as [7], which fingerprints interactions with robots, can
leverage blockchain technology.
Lastly, we can consider that a RaaS model can leverage
utility tokens to allow access to the service, and that real-time
payments to robots could be made for the delivery of real-time
services such as data collection.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper is complementary of a workshop presented at
the 2019 RO-MAN conference. The software, including smart
contracts and our open-source libraries used to connect robots
to smart contracts can be found in [26]. In conclusion, the
application of blockchain(s), smart contracts and cryptocur-
rencies in the field of robotics presents game changing oppor-
tunities. This encompasses the idea that a physical or virtual
robotic agent can engage in, unmediated, peer-to-peer financial
transactions with a human or other robots, as well as the idea
of allowing robots to enter into agreements with humans and
robots alike. When we envision the coexistence of robots and
humans - blockchains, cryptocurrencies and smart contracts
are key technologies that we must consider. Hence, this entails
the combined study of human-robot interaction, behavioral
economics, behavioral game theory and cryptoeconomics -
from now on referenced as a whole as: Robonomics.
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